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Changing in Mid-Stream: the Performance of ‘Takeover’ Prime Ministers 1916-2016 
When Theresa May became Prime Minister in July 2016 she joined 12 previous takeover leaders in 
the last 100 years. While the popular image is of Prime Ministers arriving in power after a General 
Election victory, more than half of the Prime Ministers who governed since 1916 have arrived as 
‘takeover’ leaders through an internal party process. This article analyses how takeovers perform, 
concluding that May is likely to face greater obstacles and fewer advantages than if she was elected. 
Takeovers have less time in power, less chance of winning elections and are generally rated as worse 
performing.   
There are two ways to become Prime Minister in the UK: by winning a General Election with a 
majority or by winning an internal party leadership battle to become head of the majority party 
when a Prime Minister steps down. There may be some nuances around this rule as Prime Ministers 
can govern in minority (as did Ramsey MacDonald in 1924 and 1929 and James Callaghan in 1976), 
cobble together a coalition (David Cameron in 2010) or create some informal working arrangement 
(James Callaghan in 1976-79). They can even (temporarily) not be head of the party, as occurred 
briefly with John Major in 1995. However, the person who occupies 10 Downing Street as Prime 
Minister is almost always leader of the majority party. 
 
To get to be Prime Minister through a leadership election is relatively simple. As the UK Cabinet 
Manual states: 
 
Where a Prime Minister chooses to resign from his or her individual position at a time when 
his or her administration has an overall majority in the House of Commons, it is for the party 
or parties in government to identify who can be chosen as the successor.i 
 
Exactly how a party elects their leader has varied over time. Before 1965 the leader of the 
Conservatives simply emerged following discussions with senior Tories. The rules changed so leaders 
were elected by MPs in 1965 and then by MPs and associations in 2001. Labour reformed its own 
system in 1981 and 1993, moving away from bloc votes towards One Member One Vote, and again 
in 2014 towards the current system where not only party members but also registered supporters 
can vote. These supposedly democratising reforms have increased who can participate in electing a 
leader. Leaders are increasingly autonomous, protected in both parties by stronger party rules 
against challengers and removal introduced in the 1990s and 2000s, while MPs are becoming 
increasingly rebellious and less obedient. Such changes may bring greater polarisation and conflict 
within parties. Nor have the reforms always worked to create any clear or wide choice. Both Gordon 
Brown in 2007 and Theresa May in 2016 effectively had coronations when their challengers were 
respectively shut out or dropped out. 
While the popular image of Prime Ministers arriving in power is of a welcoming dawn crowd after an 
overnight election victory, a significant number of Prime Minister have arrived as ‘takeover’ leaders. 
Out of the 20 Prime Ministers from Lloyd George in 1916 to Theresa May in 2016, 13 have been 
takeover leaders (some of whom, such as Stanley Baldwin, Harold Wilson served more than once 
and not always concurrently). The 8 elected Prime Ministers between 1916 and 2016 were in office 
for a total of 62 years of the last century while the 12 takeovers (excluding May) took up 39. So how 
do takeovers perform? Table 1 looks at the 13 Prime Ministers who took over, who they replaced 
and their previous position before becoming Prime Minister. 
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Table 1: Takeovers and Previous Position 1916-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included here is the rather complicated case of Ramsay MacDonald who took over as Prime 
Minister of a national coalition government in 1931 but, rather controversially, took over from 
himself as head of the previous Labour government.  
 
May’s ascendancy follows a set pattern as most takeover leaders enter power due to the resignation 
of their predecessor. Why leaders step down can vary: Harold Wilson left of his own accord in 1976 
while Winston Churchill’s second term ended in 1955 following pressure from doctors.  Anthony 
Eden and Harold Macmillan ‘left office partly...because they had manifestly lost the confidence of 
large parts of the Conservative Party’ and Thatcher stepped down after winning, but not winning by 
enough, in round one of a Tory leadership election. This fits with wider patterns in other 
Parliamentary democracies where party leadership is ‘seldom a safe possession’ and leaders 
Prime Minister Took Over From Previous Position 
Theresa May David Cameron in 2016 Home Secretary 
Gordon Brown Tony Blair in 1997 Chancellor 
John Major Margaret Thatcher in 
1990 
Chancellor 
James Callaghan Harold Wilson in 1976 Foreign Secretary 
Alec Douglas-Home Harold Macmillan in 
1963 
Foreign Secretary 
Harold Macmillan Anthony Eden in 1957 Chancellor 
Anthony Eden Winston Churchill in 
1955 
Foreign Secretary 
Winston Churchill Neville Chamberlain in 
1940 
First Lord of the 
Admiralty 
Neville Chamberlain Stanley Baldwin in 1937 Chancellor 
Stanley Baldwin Ramsey MacDonald in 
1935 
Lord President of the 
Council 
Stanley Baldwin   Andrew Bonar Law in 
1923 
Chancellor 
Andrew Bonar Law Lloyd George in 1922 None 
David Lloyd George Herbert Asquith in 1916 Secretary of State For 
War 
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commonly leave in one of three ways: electoral defeat, internal challenges or scandal. A wider study 
of leaders across four countries found ‘65% of all [prime ministerial departures] are more or less 
voluntary’ and though it is ‘exceedingly difficult to draw a firm line’ between genuine and forced 
resignations.ii 
May’s exact route, however, is rather unusual. Much has been made of her experience as the 
longest serving Home Secretary since Attlee’s James Chute Ede in the 1940s. No other takeover 
Prime Minister in the last century came to Downing Street directly from the Home Office, though 
two of them, Churchill and Callaghan, had served as Home Secretaries in the past. The tendency is 
for takeovers to come from ‘great offices of state’ with 5 serving as Chancellor before becoming 
Prime Minister and 3 as Foreign Secretary. Lloyd George and Churchill moved from important war 
ministries while Andrew Bonar Law stands as the exception who took over from outside the Cabinet, 
but as Conservative party leader, when the national coalition collapsed in 1922.  
The table also glosses the difficulty of getting to be Prime Minister. Most takeover leaders fight to 
get to the top and are not always the ‘anointed’ or expected candidate. John Major in 1990 and Alec 
Douglas-Home in 1963 were not favourites. May in 2016 was by no means the heir apparent, though 
her chances were seen as good.  
 
Prime Ministers: Their Role and Power 
Anthony King explained how ‘the person who walks for the first time through the door of Number 10 
as prime minister does not create or re-create the prime ministership: the job, to a considerable 
extent, already exists’. A set of tasks present themselves, of which the ability to hire and fire 
Ministers, and create and recreate Ministries, is central. A 1947 assessment listed 12 core Prime 
Ministerial tasks, though Peter Hennessy distilled 33 set tasks in the 1990s and 47 recently, covering 
new roles from national security to the ‘post-Armageddon’ instructions to Trident submarines.iii  
Heffernan and Webb characterise the premiership as having three ‘faces’: the executive, the party 
and the electoral. The executive face refers to the Prime Minister’s role in heading the government 
that gives them ‘significant conditional power’ with organisational power, resources and dominance 
of the media. The party face concerns managing the party as ‘in the final instance, the prime 
minister’s dependence on party within both executive and legislature is everything’. The electoral 
face highlights that leaders play a central role in election campaigns and can have an effect on the 
result as the personal focus of the partyiv. This article uses Heffernan and Webb’s three faces to 
review the experience of the three most recent takeovers: James Callaghan, John Major and Gordon 
Brown. I discuss in turn the performance of takeovers in winning an election, keeping their party 
together and effectiveness in running the government as Prime Minister.  
Winning a General Election 
 
Perhaps the most basic measure of Prime Ministerial performance is election winning. Prime 
Ministers are the centre of their party’s campaign. Research points to leader effects on election 
campaigns. In close elections in 1950, 1964,and February 1974 , and perhaps more recently in 2015,  
leadership influenced the results. Leaders are used by voters as a short cut to evaluate the party, 
though their effect and significance is disputed. 
 
Table 2: Takeovers: Elections, Longevity and Ranking 1916-2016 
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One of the reasons leaders leave office or are pushed is because a rival offers a better chance of 
electoral success. In the past century 5 takeovers have won and 5 lost the subsequent election (two 
                                                          
1 These are rounded to the nearest year 
2 This election was for the unique war time coalition that had not faced election before. 
Prime Minister Won or Lost 
next GE (and 
size of 
victory/loss) 
Time in 
power1 
How left 
office 
Ranking 
(out of 
20) 
Gordon Brown 
2007 
Lost 2010 
(narrow loss?) 
3 years Defeated n/a (PM 
after 
survey) 
John Major  Won 1992 
(narrow win) 
7 years Defeated 15 
James Callaghan 
1976 
Lost 1979 
(medium loss) 
3 years Defeated 12 
Alec Douglas-
Home 1963 
Lost 1964 
(narrow loss) 
1 year Defeated 19 
Harold 
Macmillan 1957 
Won 1959 
(increased 
majority) 
6 years Resigned 
(health/lost 
confidence 
of party) 
5 
Anthony Eden 
1955 
Won 1955 
(increased 
majority) 
2 years Resigned 
(health/lost 
confidence 
of party) 
20 
Winston 
Churchill 
1940 
Lost 1945 
(landslide) 
5 years Defeated 2 
Neville 
Chamberlain 
1937 
Never fought 
an election 
3 years Resigned 
(lost 
confidence 
of party) 
17 
Stanley Baldwin  Won 1935 
(lesser majority 
for coalition) 
 
2 years 
 
Resigned 
(health) 
8 
Stanley Baldwin  Lost   1923 
(hung) 
 
1 year (8 
months) 
 
Defeated 
 
8 
Andrew Bonar 
Law 
Never fought 
an election 
1 year (7 
months) 
Resigned 
(health) 
16 
David Lloyd 
George 
Won 19182 6 years Resigned 
(ejected by 
coalition) 
3 
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never fought them). Both Eden in 1955 and Macmillan in 1959 managed to increase their majority 
substantially. However, the bad news for May is that all but one of the takeover winners were more 
than fifty years ago. Since 1959 only one takeover, John Major, has won a General Election, and his 
victory in 1992 did not lead to political success (see below). No takeover has won more than one 
General Election, compared with 2 elected leaders who won 3 (Blair and Thatcher) and one who won 
four (Wilson). May appears to have an even chance of leaving office by electoral defeat or 
resignation: six takeovers lost General Elections and six resigned.  
Winning an election gives a Prime Minister a powerful boost of authority or ‘leadership capital’. All 
Prime Ministers experience a polling bounce on arrival in power that tails off over time. Takeovers 
can also benefit. Only Macmillan failed to have a bounce, perhaps due to the shock of Eden’s 
departure. The bounce of a takeover is often short-lived and small, but May’s 10 point lift in the 
month after her arrival in power was a far higher bounce than for Callaghan, Major or Brown. 
 
 
Table 3: Leadership Polling ‘Bounce’ for Callaghan, Major, Brown and Mayv 
 
Prime Minister Average Bounce size (+) Time Frame 
Callaghan 3.5 April-May 1976 
Major 5 December 1990 
Brown 5 July-Aug 2007 
May 10 July-Aug 2016 
 
 
Takeover leaders should, presumably, suffer from not having election win behind them and would 
be minded to secure their own. However, the last takeover to quickly call an election, a mere nine 
days after becoming Prime Minister, was Anthony Eden in 1955. Macmillan waited four years from 
1955 until 1959. All the other modern takeovers from Home to Callaghan, Major and Brown sought 
to hang on to the end of their term limit and to, as Churchill put it, ‘stay in the pub until closing 
time’. Both Callaghan in 1978 and Brown in 2007 backed down from calling an early election, with 
Brown losing his reputation for competence and decisiveness in doing so. This hanging on appears in 
part simple indecisiveness and also based on a hope that something will change when faced with 
poor polling numbers. May seems to be following this pattern and ruled out an early election with 
the slightly ambiguous statement that ‘there should be no general election until 2020’. Allies have 
spoken of how she intended to govern to the end of her inherited mandate.  
 
How the lack of electoral legitimacy weakens a takeover is unclear. On a personal level John Major 
famously admitted to ‘a sneaking feeling that I was living in sin with the electorate’ before winning 
his own mandatevi. Politically the media and opponents may use the lack of legitimacy against a 
leader. The focus on Gordon Brown’s supposed illegitimacy from 2007 onwards, given he was 
‘crowned’ in an unopposed Labour leadership contest, helped undermine his authority amid an 
increasingly beleaguered premiership.  
 
Like Gordon Brown before her, May faces the charge of not only being unelected by the populace 
but also of being ‘crowned’ unopposed by the party. Despite May’s apparent ruling out of an 
election, opposition parties have complained that May was elected only via 199 Conservative MPs 
and had no mandate. There has also been some pressure for an early poll from Conservative MPs 
and right-wing tabloids, though this has been for reasons of opportunity rather than legitimacy. If 
May were to call an early election it would make her the first in more than half a century to do so.  
She also faces a slight harder task in ‘calling’ an election than her predecessors, as technically an 
election would need to meet the terms of the Fixed Term Parliament Act 2011, requiring a vote of no 
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confidence or a supermajority This can, however, be got round by pushing a  simple ‘reset’ law 
through Parliament.vii 
 
It is because of the loss of elections that takeovers’ time in office is, on average, is relatively brief. UK 
Prime Ministers on average have lasted five years, one maximum Parliamentary term. Takeover 
tenure was considerably shorter at just over three years, compared with an average of 7.8 years for 
election winners.  
 
Table 4: Prime Ministerial Tenure 1916-2016 (Years) 
 
 
 
 
 
The longest takeover was John Major at seven years (1990-1997) with Lloyd George (1916-1922) and 
Harold MacMillan (1957-1963) each surviving six years. The shortest premiership was Andrew Bonar 
Law’s 7 months (1922-1923), followed by Stanley Baldwin at eight months (1923-1924) and Douglas-
Home at two days short of a year (1963-1964).  
Longevity is linked to achievement. On Theakston and Gill’s ratings, reviewed below, ‘the top-rated 
post-war prime ministers all served at least six years in Downing Street [...]six years in office—
requiring re-election at least once—seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for having 
an impact, leaving a policy legacy and enhancing a prime-ministerial reputation’.viii  
 
A further difficulty for May’s longevity stems from the so-called ‘glass cliff’ that affects female 
leaders. O’Brien’six study of 10 parliamentary democracies between 1965 and 2013 identified 45 
female leaders out of 328, a figure that had been rising steadily over the past few decades. Women 
leaders, as in May’s case may serve as a symbol of change and are ‘often associated with renewal 
and...offer a visible break from the past’. However the study, built upon previous research into 
female  FTSE 100 company leaders and MPs, found that ‘women’s initial access to power increases 
when the post is least attractive’ and once in office ‘female leaders are also more likely than men to 
leave the position when facing an unfavourable electoral trajectory’. Female leaders are ‘doubly 
disadvantaged with respect to the party leadership’ as they are ‘more likely to initially come to 
power when the post is least desirable’ and then ‘have a greater likelihood of leaving the post when 
their parties lose seat share’. Female leaders are held to higher expectations and different 
standards. The mean duration in office of prime ministers, over 50 years in four  countries is 6.38 
years for male leaders and 4.97 years for women.x  
 
Holding their party together  
The fate of a Prime Minister in the UK is tied to their party.  As King explained: ‘to an extent that is 
sometimes overlooked by outsiders, the prime ministership is a party job before it is a governmental 
or national job’xi. British politics is less one of formal government and opposition but ‘over the 
shoulder politics’ with leaders looking backwards at the potential threat from their own party 
benches. Leaders are now more secure in their post but govern more fractious and rebellious 
parties.xii 
 
Since the 1970s, but more continuously since the 1990s, government MPs are increasingly prone to 
rebel  Labour MPs rebelled to varying degrees in 30% of all government whipped votes under New 
Prime Minister Average tenure (years) 
UK All 5 
UK Election winners 7.8   
UK Takeover 3.3 
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Labour and each Parliament since has been more rebellious that the last. One of the key weaknesses 
of Callaghan, Major and Brown is that they all headed fractured parties. Callaghan faced the 
toughest test, as he lost his majority the day he entered office and was able to survive only by 
agreement with the Liberals until 1978 and then with the support of  minor parties. John Major won 
a majority of 21 in his 1992 election that soon became ‘cursedly small’ as he faced rebellion and 
eroding numbers through lost by-elections. By 1997 his effective majority had eroded to zero. 
Though Major’s level of party rebellion did not come near Callaghan’s, the deep divisions in the 
Conservative party around the Maastricht agreement and media focus magnified the effect, 
especially when Major complained of ‘bastards’ and removed the whip from four sitting MPs. 
Brown’s majority of 66 seemed secure but he faced 235 separate rebellions across his three years. 
His authority was eroded through a series of rebellions, U-turns and compromises on high profile 
issues from the Lisbon Treaty to terrorism and welfare. For all three, the rebellions not only 
disrupted tight legislative timetables but severely damaged the image of the leaders.  
 
For Major and Brown the over the shoulder politics worsened from rebellion to outright leadership 
challenge. Removing a sitting party leader Prime Minister is increasingly difficult, as changes to 
institutional rules have strengthened their position vis a vis MPs. Nevertheless, Major had to fight 
and win a leadership election in 1995 and Brown faced three abortive challenges between 2007 and 
2010. Major’s margin of victory in 1995 was ‘less than I had hoped for and more than I had feared...it 
was not really enough’. Like most leaders who are challenged, Major and Brown never recovered 
their authority and become trapped ‘in a downward spiral of post-challenge recriminations...bad 
publicity, sliding polls...and continued leadership speculation’.xiii  
 
May has a more potentially rebellious party than her predecessors. May has a smaller majority than 
Major, with just 17 seats, a number that will magnify the influence of unhappy MPs and the effect of 
any rebellion. This number now includes 11 former Ministers, ‘dispossessed’ by her dismissals, 
including ex-Chancellor George Osborne. Her party is also riven with a spectrum of opinion from 
hard-line and soft Leavers to Remainers. So far, despite predictions of a Conservative split, it is 
Labour that suffered more deeply in the aftermath of Brexit. It remains to be seen if May’s 
appointment of prominent Leavers to Cabinet and her promise that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ can unite 
her party or will just temporarily paper over the divisions while giving potential rivals such as Boris 
Johnson bases to undermine her.  
 
Performance in government 
Beyond winning, how are Prime Ministers judged? The danger for any takeover is that they become, 
like Callaghan, Major and Brown, what Roy Jenkins called ‘suffix’ Prime Ministers, acting as ‘historical 
codas to an era’.xiv 
Any takeover inherits the same office, resources and structural advantages of being Prime Minister, 
placing them at the centre of executive power and the media’s attention. The polling ‘bounce’ 
provided by their arrival may even empower them against other powerful actors temporarily, as 
does the sense of difference with their predecessor and symbolism of change.  
There are few systematic measures or analyses of Prime Ministerial performance of the sort 
developed for US Presidents. Rankings of Prime Ministers also have a bias towards those leading 
during crises or great events. The rankings in Table 2 come from Theakston’s 2004 survey of 139 
politics and history academics; it took in 20 Prime Ministers from Lord Salisbury to Tony Blair. The 
results fitted broadly with similar polls of the public and journalists.  
Rankings can, of course, only take us so far. A Prime Minister must be assessed on whether they had 
the skills in a particular environment and context. Stability, crisis, war or peace and can all determine 
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success or failure. This combines with the equally difficult problem of personality and agency. Prime 
Ministers themselves disagreed on what personality traits make for a good Prime Minister: Harold 
Wilson said it was the ability to sleep well, Edward Heath felt it was calm in a crisis and Clement 
Attlee argued it was a lack of ego.  
Based on this ranking, takeovers performed less well than General Election winners. The two highest 
ranking takeovers, Lloyd George, who came third in the survey, and Winston Churchill, who came 
second, would be regarded as high performing if not ‘great’, leading Britain in the First and Second 
World War respectively amid deepest national crisis. In fifth place is another takeover, Harold 
Macmillan, who was highly rated not only for winning a 99 seat majority but for his influential 
actions on, for example, de-colonisation and Europe.  
More worrying for Prime Minister May, the bottom 5 of the rankings are all takeovers. The nether 
reaches of Theakston’s survey contains names such as Anthony Eden and Neville Chamberlain, who 
failed in crises partly of their own making, and the very briefly serving Alec Douglas-Home and 
Andrew Bonar Law. John Major, ranked 15, became the worst polling Prime Minister in history and 
went down to one of the largest electoral defeats in modern political history in 1997. Though Brown 
is not included, later assessments tend towards failure. 
Judged on the mixture of context and personal skills, the last three takeovers come out differently. 
Callaghan, Major and Brown all had to govern in challenging contexts, facing economic crises and 
leading divided parties and a strong opposition. Callaghan displayed considerable skills, perhaps 
accounting for his higher rating in the rankings, whereas Major is widely viewed as a poor and 
inadequate leader who was out of his depth. Brown too appeared to lack skills or luck and Theakston 
and Gill pointed out that his reaction to the 2007 financial crisis was widely praised but bought little 
political benefit. 
May inherits one of the biggest peacetime political challenges ever faced by a Prime Minister and 
her premiership will stand or fall on Brexit. As well as pursuing complex negotiations, the Prime 
Minister must also hold together a divided party and divided country, with the future unity of the UK 
in doubt. She is not just taking on the task with a working machine but is restructuring it 
substantially, creating two new whole departments to lead on Brexit, the Department of Exiting the 
European Union (DEXEU) and the Department for International Trade (DIT) that are already the 
subject of Whitehall turf wars. Responsibility and control will, however, ultimately reside with 
Downing Street. Much will depend on her skills. May has been praised for her determined and 
principled leadership at the Home Office by some, but others have highlighted her similarities to 
Gordon Brown, pointing to a tendency to blame avoidance (especially in the 2011 Border Agency 
controversy), obsession with detail and secrecy. Under May Downing Street has sought increasing 
control over policy and presentation. Neither number 10 nor DEXEU has formulated any clear 
solutions, instead offering a mixture of vague promises (‘Brexit means Brexit’ or controlling 
immigration) and hostages to fortune over Northern Ireland’s border and Scotland’s influence. 
Conclusion 
Takeovers face greater obstacles and fewer advantages than elected Prime Ministers. On average 
they have less time in power, less chance of winning elections and are rated as worse performing. If 
leadership is seen as using ‘skills in context’ or ‘structuring the world so that you can win’ then 
takeover Prime Ministers face tougher environments and fewer opportunities, often being greeted 
with divided parties, deep crises and less room for manoeuvre.xv So what are the lessons for Theresa 
May’s Premiership? First, May can’t expect great longevity though a victory on or before 2020 would 
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still put her above the average takeover tenure. In terms of exit, she appears to have exactly even 
chances of leaving office by election defeat or resignation. Second, party unity will be key. Callaghan, 
Major and Brown all inherited an unhappy and rebellious Parliamentary party: the question is 
whether Brexit provides an opportunity for May to persuade or force the party to cohere or makes 
her an over the shoulder Prime Minister who must compromise at every step. Third, May must 
demonstrate skills in a very difficult context, as she faces a huge and complex strategic task for 
which she carries personal responsibility. The record of takeovers, whatever their experience, tends 
towards failure. Eden over Suez, Chamberlain at Munich or Major and Maastricht are all now by-
words for political failure. Even when there is success it goes unrewarded or unrecognised, as with 
Brown in 2007. May will need a large amount of skill, luck and support if she is to avoid the short 
unhappy fate of the takeover Prime Minister. 
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